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-2DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT

This is an appeal by the Plaintiffs from the judgement of the court entered pursuant to a motion by the
Defendantsfora non-suit after the case had been called and jury selected, and after some of the Plaintiffs'
witnesses had been cal led and heard and other certain
offers of proof were made by Plaintiffs. The court
granting said motion and entering judgement for the
Defendants dismissing the action with prejudice and
awarding the Defendants their costs of court on the
fol lowing grounds:
a.

The evidence including the proffered additional pfoof was found insufficient to show Defendants were neg Iigent;

b.

The evidence including the proffered additional proof shows the sole proximate cause of
the collisionwasthenegligenceof Kim Mortenson, the driver of the vehicle in which the
Plaintiff, David Patrick Alumbaugh, was riding
from which judgment Plaintiffs now appeal.
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF

THE STATE OF UTAH
BETTY ANDERSON, and
DAVID PATRICK ALUMBAUGH aka
DAVID PATRICK ANDERSON, his
Guardian Ad Litem,
Plaintiffs and Appelants,
vs.
PARSON RED-E-MIX PAVING
COMPANY, INC., a Utah
Corporation, and MAX E. GREEN,
et al,
Defendants and Respondents.

BRIEF OF
APPELLANTS
Civil Case No.
10, 502

APPELLANTS BRIEF

STATEMENT OF FACTS
On Apri I 22, 1966 the Defendant, Max Green,
acting in his capacity as an employee of Parson RedE-Mix Paving Company, Inc. delivered a load of ready
mix concrete to the Phi 11 ips 66 Service Station located
at 4th North and Main Street in Brigham City, Utah.
Immediately following the delivery, he left the exten-

-4sion chutes extending to the rear and proceeded on to
4th North Street just West of the Phi 11 ips 66 Service
Station and parked at a point where the asphalt surface
of the road narrows, which location is about 150 feet
West of the West curb line of the Main Street intersection and 4th North. Said Vehicle was parked with
both its left rear duals on the oiled surface of the road
(R 186). The area immediate Iy to the North of where
the truck parked was open and unused (Defendant's
Exhibit 4) and is general Iy used for the purpose of
parking heavy equipment and trucks. This area was
open and avai Iable on the the date in question (R 48& 49).
Said Defendant, Max Green, then proceeded to get
out of his truck and climb to the platform at the rear
of the mixer and began rinsing out the excess cement
in the chutes. The chutes projected directly East and
extended beyond the main body of the truck 9 feet 3
inches (R 255). There were no warning devices or red
flags handing from the end of the chute. The time was
approximately 4:30 P. M. and the sun was setting in the
West. The oiled surface of the road was 27 feet wide
at the location where the truck was parked (R 108),
however this created a false impression, because just
a few feet to the rear of the truck at the West edge
of the Service Station property the entire width of the
right of way was hard surfaced and wider making the
entire right of way hard surface and usable for travel
from the truck to the Main Street intersection, except
for a few feet behind the truck. The truck was thus
located at the time of the col Iis ion in question.
The Plaintiff, a fifteen (15) year old boy, was a
rear seat passenger in a vehicle driven by one, Kim
Mortenson. There was also another passenger named

-5Mark Herbert who was riding in the right front seat.
Immediately prior to the accident, the Mortenson Vehicle had proceeded North Along Main Street from 2nd
South to the 4th North and Main Street intersection in
a norm a I and uneventfu I manner. At 4th North, the
Mortenson vehicle pulled into the left hand storage and
left turn lane in preparation to make a left hand turn.
He then stopped and waited for traffic coming from the
North to clear the intersection. Mortenson had just
started into a left hand turn when Mark Herbert warned
the driver to accelerate in order to avoid collision with
a vehicle which Mortenson had failed to see coming
from the North. In response to the warning, Mortenson
over-accelerated and the car began to slide on some
loose material on the road surface. While he was thus
proceeding West with the rearend in a sideways slide
and approximately 50 feet West of the curb line, he
first noticed the Defendant' s truck parked on the roadway. The driver at that point had sufficiently regained
control and he thought that he could avoid collision by
proceeding to the southwest and around the left side of
the truck, but he failed to observe the steel chute extending to the rear (R 219 & 220) and although he wa'.
not sliding he collided with the extended chutes, whic1
chutespenatrated the right hand side of the vehicle one
into the rear seat (Defendant's Exhibit 9) where the
Plaintiff was riding as a passenger. As a direct result
of the chutes entering the rear seat area, the Plaintiff
received serious and permanent in juries, the extent of
which are not a part of this appeal.
POINT# I
The court erred in holding Plaintiffs evidence failed

-6to show neg Iigence on the part of Defendants. The
evidence of the Plaintiff showed that the Defendant,
Max Green, was negligent in the fol lowing respects:
1. That he parked his truck with the left hand side
onto the traveled portion and the hard surfaced area
of the street at a location where such parking was prohibited by Section 41-6-101, Utah Code, providing
as fol lows:
"Upon any highway outside of a business or residence district no person shal I stop, park, or leave
standing any vehicle, whether attended or unattended, upon the paved or main traveled part of
the highway when it is practical to stop, park, or
so leave such vehicle off such part of said highway, but in every event an unobstructed width
of the highway opposite a standing vehi de shal I
be left for the free passage of other vehicles and
a clear view of such stopped vehicle shall be
available from a distance of 200 feet in each direction upon such highway.
This section shal I not apply to the driver of any
vehicle which is disabled while on the paved or
main traveled portion of a highway in such manner and to such extent that it is impossible to avoid
stopping and temporarily leaving such disabled
vehicle in such position. 11
The area was neither being used for residential or
commercial, nevertheless, said property had been zoned commercial and abutting there to residential. It is
Plaintiffs position that the actual conditions of the use

-7of the property should be controlling rather than the
availability created by a zoning statute. The adjoining property in this case was a vacant lot graveled and
used to park equipment. In a similar case Hil Iyard vs.
Utah By-Products Co., lU (2d) 143, 263 P. 2d 287,
the statute was applied as to availability to park off
the road.
In the case of Hil Iyard vs. Utah By-Products the
factual situation was that the Defendant had partially
driven his vehicle into a private driveway and the Court
determined that where the space was available he had
a duty to drive so that his entire vehicle was off the
road. This case apparently in applying the statutory
provision took into consideration the availability of an
area in which to pull the truck entirely off the road
rather than applying the narrow construction, as there
was a single residence that they were in fact in a residential area which would allow for parking on the travel
portion, however the court held it did apply based on
availability of space off the roadway to park.
In this case on appeal there was not only a driveway available but an entire graveled lot and further
there was no real need to stop at this location as the Defendant's own testimony is: 11 { R41) That it was a 10 minute drive from the location to the Parson Red-E-Mix yards
where equipment was available to take care of clean
up and to dispose of any excess materials he may have
had. II
139 P 2d 76 Takako et al vs. Ede et al
In that Ede case the defendant had fa i Ied to pu 11 complete Iy into a parking place at the side of a snow packed

-8road. The rear end of the car extended some 5 feet out of
the parking area into the traveled portion of the road. Another vehicle had been sliding out of control for a distance of 90 feet and was sti II out of control when it col lided with the defendant's vehicle. The plaintiff was
a pedestrian standing at the other side of the parked
vehicle and was injured as a result of the collision,
driving the defendants vehicle into her.
"The appe II ant argues that the efficient and proximate cause of the accident was the skidding of the
Ede car. It is quite true that had not the Ede car ,gone
out of control it probably would not have struck appellant' s car. Neve rt he less, as in the case of Pastene v.
Adams, 49 Cal. 87, the negligent piling of the lumber
in the streetdidnotcause the trucktobe driven against
it, thereby toppling over and injuring the plaintiff,
but the court in that instance held that pi Iing lumber
in such a fashion was concurring negligence in that it
concurred with the negligence of thedriverofthetruck
and the judgement against the defendant was sustained.
This court cannot say that the situation here presented
is at all different than that in the Pastene case. In the
present case the alleged negligent parking by appellant was a question of fact and was found by the jury
to be a continuing negligence and a violation of the
Motor Vehicle Code, St. 1935, p. 93, and therefore
was a concurring negligence with that of the defendant
Ede."
The Court erred in holding that Section 41-6-101
was not applicable in this case for the erroneous reason
that the area was commercial or residential, and not
the actual facts existing, which were the said property
was not being used for either commercial or residential

-9purposes even though the Brigham City zoning ordinance makes the area avai Iable for that type of development. The lower court failed to take into consideration the availability of off street parking which in the
instant case shows an open graveled yard on the north
side (Defendant's Exhibit 4 - photo of open parking
area) and vacant lots on the other side. The above was
the condition of the entire distance from Main Street to
First West, except for the property East of where the
collision occurred where there was a service station on
the one corner.
It is the Plaintiff's position that such an interpretation would do away with the basic purpose of the statute in that the general public traveling on the road
would not be apprised except by the actual surrounding
conditions. It seems clear in giving the particular statute in question this interpretation wil I lend itself to the
purpose for the passing of all traffic regulations, that
is, the safety and convenience of the general public in
the use of the roads. It therfore fol lows that the actual existing conditions must be taken into consideration and not merely the passing of a zoning ordinance which can at best make certain property available for commercial and residential development. The
control ling factor should be, was it being used for
residential or commercial purposes at the time in question? The record makes it quite clear that it was not;
and therefore the Plaintiff's contention is that Section
41-6-101 applies in the above entitled case and that
the Defendant was in violation of said section.
The affirmative evidence shows that the adjoining
property was available for parking and that the immed-

-10iate area was not being used for commercial nor residential purposes. In addition to being in violation of the
above section, the defendants parking in the above location was dangerous and negligent because of its proximity with the Main Street intersection. It was forseeable that vehicles would come off a busy Main Street
intersection at such speeds that the parking of the
truck in this location would create an unreasonable
hazard. Additional facts that should have been considered by a reasonable and prudent person was that at
the given time of day, to wit: 4:30 p. m., the setting
sun caused interference with the normal vision of drivers and further that because of the increased width of
the hard surfaced road immediately to the rear, drivers
coming from Main Street would have the impression
that there was more roadway available than in fact
there was.
Without reference to the statutory violation - Hillyard Case, 263 Pacific 287 290, "The parking of a vehicle upon the paved or travel
portion of a highway is generally regarded as a hazard to traffic thereon. 11
Therefore it was only proper for the jury to determine
if there was an emergency justifing defendants parking in the location in question. The evidence showed no pressing need to park in this location. The availability of adjoining space on which parking could be
made was not control led by the zoning ordinance and
did not change the actual use of the property. It was
neither commercial nor residential and therefore the
statutory provisions should be applied.
2. Violation of Brigham City Ordinance 256 Sec-

- 11tion 136 which provides as follows:
"No person shal I drive any vehicle with a load or
object upon such vehicle extending four feet or
more beyond the bed or body of said vehicle without having during daytime a red flag at least 16
inches square attached at the extreme rear end of
the load or object so protruding, and so hung that
the entire area is visible to the driver of a vehicle
approaching from the rear . . . "
The evidence shows that the cement chute extended
9 feet 3 inches, the ordinance provides that any extension over 4 feet from the body of the truck should
have a red flag 16 inches square for the purpose of
giving warni.:g to vehicles approaching from the rear.
In this case there were no flags. The only material
difference in the BrighamCityOrdinanceand the State
Code on this subject is that the Brigham City ordinance
provides for the projection to be an object or a portion
of the load while Section 41-6-128 provides for the extension of the load.
Utah Code Annotated 1953 Section 41-6-128 which
provides as fol lows:
"Whenever the load upon any vehicle extends to
the rear four feet or more beyond the bed or body
of such vehicle there shall be displayed a the extreme rear end of the load, at the times specified
in section 41-6-118 hereof, a red light or lantern
plainly visible from a distance of at least 500 feet
to the sides and rear. The red Iight or Iantern required under this section shall be in addition to
the red rear light required upon every vehicle.

-12At any other time there shal I be displayed at the
extreme rear end of such load a red flag or cloth
not less than 12 inches square, and so hung that
the entire area is visible to the driver of a vehicle
approaching from the rear. 11
It seems apparent that the legislature in passing
this particular section was aware of the dangerous condition created by projecting objects and that motorists
would, unless special warning devices were placed on
them, fail to observe them and therefore the situation
which existed here was the actual situation foreseen
by the legislature, and therefore the ordinance and
State Code section should be applied in determining
the negligence of the Defendant.
The Court erred further in holding that provmon
Utah Code Ann. Section 41-6-128 was not applicable
to the Defendant for the following reason:
That the undisputed evidence shows that the entire
truck was parked within the right of way of the road.
That the extension of the chutes was stipulated to be
9 feet 3 inches from the main body of the truck (R 225).
Further, that the chutes when in position for traveling
and folded up did not extend beyond the body of the
truck but when unfolded and extended as they were
in this case, extended 9 feet 3 inches to the rear.
The Brigham City ordinance and the State Code provides that any extension beyond 4 feet requires a red
flag not less than 12 and 16 inches square be hung so
that the entire area is visible to a driver approaching
from the rear. In this case there was no red flag at the
end of the chute and the evidence shows that the direct

-13cause of the Plaintiff's in juries was the entry of the
chute into the rear portion of the vehicle, the area in
which the Plaintiff was riding as a guest passenger.
POINT II
PROXIMATE CAUSE
THE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE SOLE
PROXIMATE CAUSE OF THE PLAIN TIFF'S INJURIES
WAS THE NEGLIGENCE OF KIM MORTENSON, THE
DRIVER, OF THE VEHICLE IN WHICH THE PLAINTIFF
WAS RIDING. It was stipulated by the Defendant
for the purpose of his motion that the facts showed
a lack of contributory neg I igence on the part of the
Plaintiff and therefore it is not argued in this brief.
It is admitted that there was neg I igence on the part of
Kim Mortenson that concurred with the negligence of
the Defendant in causing the injuries, but that except
for the concurring negligence of the Defendant there
would have been no collision.
As relates to the proximate cause of the above col 1ision Kim Mortenson testified (R 230) that he did see the
truck prior to the collision, that in his opinion he had
regained sufficient control that he would be able to
avoid the col Iis ion, but denies that he ever observed
the extended chute prior to the col Iiding with it.
65 C. J. S. Negligence Section 19 (c) P 418-420
states as fol lows:
"The generally accepted view is that violation of
a statutory duty constitutes neg Iigence, neg I igence as
a matter of law, or, according to the decisions on the
question, negligence per se, for the reason that non-

-14observance of what the legislature has prescribed as a
suitable precaution is failure to observe that care which
an ordinarily prudent man would observe, and, when
the state regards certain acts as so liable to injure others as to justify their absolute prohibition, doing the
forbidden act is a breach of duty with respect to those
who may be injured thereby; or, as it has been otherwise expressed, when the standard of care is fixed by
law, failure to conform to such standard is neg Iigence.
According to this view it is immaterial, where a statute has been violated, whether the act or omission
constiiting such violation would have been regarded
as negligence in the absence of any statute on the subject or whether there was, as a matter of fact, any
reason to anticipate that injury would result from such
violation."
In addition to the above being in violation for the
statutory prohibition of al lowing the extension out,
there were additional reasons why the al lowing of the
extension was hazardous which are as follows:

l. That because of the proximity of the truck to
the corner, cars which could be expected to make
the turnoff from Main Street on to 4th North wou Id
only have a short distance in which to make their observation thereby making it more probable that drivers
would fail to see the extended chutes. Also because
of the time of day and the setting of the sun, the chutes location would be within the location of the shadow cast by the truck itself and the sun would be shining into the eyes of the drivers coming from the East,
al I of which factors were apparent to any prudent person making reasonable observations.
For the above reasons the court committed an error

-15in finding that the Plaintiff's evidence was void of
any facts upon which a reasonable person could find
that the Defendant was guilty of negligence.
CONCLUSION
In final conclusion the evidence taken in the light
most favorable to the plaintiff shows that:
1. There was evidence on which the jury could
have reasonably concluded that the acts of
defendant constituted negligence. That said acts of neg Iigence
were a concurring and contributing cause without which
the injuries to the plaintiff would not have occurred
and therefore the court erred in taking this question
from the jury. ·
2. That there was sufficient evidence that the acts
of negligence of Kim Mortenson, although contributing
to the injuries of the plaintiff, in and of themselves,
would not have caused the injury to the plaintiff and
therefore the court erred in finding that said neg Iigence
was the sole proximate cause as a matter of law, and
therfore plaintiff prays that the judgement of the court
be set aside and the mater be returned to the District
Court and a new trial ordered and that the appellent be
awarded costs on appeal.
Respectfully submitted,
Dale M. Dorius, Esq.,
Attorney for Plaintiffs
and Appe 11 ants

